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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
BOYD D. HARPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT 
Case No. 860281-a 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appeal from a conviction and judgement of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-5-103 (1983) in Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for, Salt Lake County, in a bench 
trial, before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, Judge 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent requests this Court consider the 
following facts in addition to those stated by 
defendant. 
1. The judge found the evidence was "undisputed" 
(R. p.5): 
M
 The evidence in this case really, for all 
intents and purposes, is undisputed that 
occurred." 
2. The victim's testimony about being punched at 
least twice was not contradicted by the defendant. 
(Tr.131) 
Q (Defense counsel) ... did you hit her? 
A (Defendant) yes. 
Q How many times? 
A Once. I don't know. I might have hit her twice. 
I was mad and about three-quarters drunk. 
3. The medical evidence showed the victim 
"probably" was hit by "at least two..." punches. (Tr. 
98) 
Q (Prosecutor) Assuming that it were fists 
that had been used, do you have an 
opinion as to the number of blows that 
the victim would have sustained to cause these 
injuries? 
A (Doctor) It's conceivable it could have 
happened with one. My guess, if I had to 
say would be probably at least two, but 
there is no way to say that it wasn't ten or 
20. 
4. The judge ruled defendant's credibility was 
"impaired" "somewhat" based upon his "prior record". (R. 
7): 
I think his credibility for truth and veracity 
is somewhat impaired because of his prior 
record. 
5. This was a non-jury trial. 1. 
1. Hereafter the TRIAL TRANSCRIPT will be 
referred to as, (Tr. ), the JUDGE'S RULING 
will be referred to as (R. ), and APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF as (App. Br. at ). 
2 
SUMMARY QF ABQUMSNT 
Defendant fails to sustain his burden of showing he 
was deprived of his right to effective assistance of 
counsel. 
POINT I-ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SUSTAIN 
HIS BURDEN THAT HE WAS 
DENIED' EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims ineffective representation because 
his attorney did not object to: 1) questions about his 
prior theft convictions, 2) a hypothetical medical 
question, 3) the prosecutor's foundation for the 
introduction of pictures, 4) the claimed cumulative and 
prejudicial nature of certain pictures, 5) non-
responsive answers, and 6) alleged prosecutorial 
fishing and badgering. Defendant also complains of 
inadequate preparation. 
To support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel- defendant has the burden of showing the 
existence of 1) "prejudice" and 2) counsel's "deficient 
performance", State v Frame. 723 P.2d 401,403 (Utah 
1986). The sequence a court needs to follow in testing 
an ineffectiveness of counsel claim was described in 
3 
State v Pursifell. 72 Utah Adv. Rep. 38, 40: 
We need not decide whether counsel's 
performance was deficient if defendant fails 
to satisfy his burden of showing he was 
prejudiced as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies. 
A-PB&7UPTO 
In State v Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 402 (Utah 1986), 
the Court said a verdict will not be overturned unless 
defendant shows that "affirmatively" that prejudicial 
evidence created: 
...a reasonable probability exists, that but 
for counsel's error, the result would have 
been different. 
Bearing on the effect of prejudice is that the 
instant case was a bench trial. As the Court said in 
Del Porto v Nicolo, 495 P2d. 811, 
814 (Utah 1972): 
Where the trial is to the court, the rulings 
on the admissability of evidence are not 
required to be so strict, nor are they of such 
critical importance, as where the trial is to 
a jury it is assumed the trial judge has 
superior knowledge as to the competency and 
effect which should be given evidence, and 
that he will make the findings and decision in 
conformance therewith, (footnote omitted) 
It is presumed a judge will disregard extraneous 
matters. While defendant makes numerous claims the 
effect of these alleged errors should not treated with 
such "critical importance". 
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In State v Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah 1986) the 
appellant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel at 
his murder trial. The Court stated the appellant had not 
"specifically" identified "prejudicial" evidence that 
was: 
...was improperly or unfairly admitted 
(because)...the eyewitness testimony.. was 
uncontroverted by defendant's own explanation 
of the event. Defendant admitted his 
threatening comments...Defendant had adequate 
opportunity to explain his defense to the 
jury...but he had been drinking heavily, 
1
 blacked out' during the fight, and did not 
remember what happened. 
In the instant case the evidence of defendant's 
convictions was not "improperly" admitted. As State v 
Peterson, 722 P. 2d at 769-770 (Utah 1986) states, 
quoting Kizer v State. 93 P.2d 58 (Okla. 1639): 
(I)mpeaching questions should not be 
propounded unless they are based upon facts 
the interrogator intends to present in 
refutation of adverse answering of questions 
propounded; such a line of questioning should 
be done in good faith, and not for the purpose 
of prejudicing and arousing suspicion of the 
JURY, (emphasis added) 
The prosecutor's questions were reasonably 
accurate, asked in "good faith", and "based upon facts". 
(Tr. 136). The prosecutor's clarifying questions were 
not asked "for the purpose of prejudicing and arousing 
suspicion..." 
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The prosecutor's questions are justified by Utah R. 
of Evid. 609(a)(2) which provides in part: 
(a)For the purpose of attacking credibility of 
a witness, evidence that he has been convicted 
of a crime shall be elicited from him...during 
cross examination but only if the 
crime...(2)involved dishonesty or false 
statement, regardless of punishment. 
In State v Cintron. 680 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1984), 
the Court construed supplanted Utah R. Evid. 21. That 
Rule addressed the admissability of crimes "involving 
dishonesty or false statement". (language identical to 
that in Utah R. of Evid. 609(a)(2) and said: 
". ..theft is admissible since it obviously 
involves "dishonesty". 
The general rule concerning the use of convictions 
under Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a)(2) is stated in 
39 American Law Reports Fed. 507, 1984, "Witnesses Prior 
Convictions": 
Unlike the trial court's duty to exercise 
discretion in weighing the probative value 
versus the prejudice in determining the 
admissability of evidence of felony 
convictions ..., the trial court can exercise 
no discretion in admitting evidence of crimes 
involving dishonesty and false statement. 
In light of the prosecutor's "good faith" 
questioning", Utah R. of Evid. 609, the general rule, 
and Cintron, defendant has not shown these questions 
were "improper". 
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These answers were not "unfairly" admitted. In 
United States v Wong. 703 F.2d 65, (3rd. Cir i983) the 
court described how Congress compromised and adopted 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609. This Congressional 
compromise was reached after balancing fairness to the 
Government against fairness to the defendant. As the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the 
House Judiciary Committee said at 67, 68: 
...Rule 609(a) is such a specific rule. It 
was the product of extensive Congressional 
attention and considerable legislative 
compromise, clearly reflecting a decision that 
judges were to have no discretion to exclude 
crimen falsi... Various ways of treating 
impeachment by conviction were proposed. The 
compromise that resulted in the final version 
of Rule 609(a)... 
The elicited testimony about defendant's 
record was not unfair. The representatives of the people 
decided such questions were fair and permissible by 
adopting this Rule. 
In State v Speer. 750 P.2d 186, (Utah 1988), the 
Court addressed the effect of "prejudice" in a similar 
context. In that case the defendant was convicted of two 
charges and acquitted of two charges. In the rebuttal 
portion of the trial the judge admitted proof of 
defendant's prior bad acts. On appeal the Court found 
the judge's ruling erroneous and prejudicial but 
declined to overrule the verdict. 
7 
Notably Speer differs from the instant case because 
it was a jury trial. However Speer and the instant case 
are similar because of the standard used to test for 
prejudice. 
In State v Speer. 750 P.2d at 189 (Utah 1988) the 
Court described its standard. The Court said it would 
overturn a verdict where prejudicial evidence was 
admitted only after looking "to the evidence as a whole" 
and determining if because it: 
...THERE IS A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD A 
DIFFERENT RESULT WOULD HAVE BEEN REACHED, 
(emphasis added and citations omitted) 
The standard to test the effect of the admission of 
prejudicial evidence in an ineffective counsel appeal 
was stated in State v. Archuleta. 747 P.2d 1019, 1021 
(Utah 1987): 
...the defendant must show there was a 
REASONABLE PROBABILITY, that but for counsel's 
unprofessional error, THE RESULT OF THE 
PROCEEDING WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT, 
(emphasis added and citation omitted). 
The standards in Speer and Archuleta are almost 
identical as a comparison of the emphasized words show. 
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Even assuming arguendo the testimony about 
defendant's convictions was prejudicial this Court 
should not overturn this case. The factors and standard 
described in Speer are virtually indistinguishable to 
those that apply in the instant case. 
In State v Speer, 750 P.2d at 189 (Utah 1988), the 
Court found the evidence was uncontradicted and 
undisputed: 
The evidence was not contradictory. The 
factual events related by the victim were not 
disputed by the defendant. 
The Speer Court at 189 looked at how "crucial" the 
evidence was: 
Therefore, the jury's determination of the 
facts, which may be subject to influence by 
the admission of improper evidence, was not 
crucial to this case. 
The same Court stated the jury verdict was the result of 
a "reasoned application" of the law uninfluenced by 
prejudice at 189, 190: 
...the jury acquitted defendant of two of four 
charges...the verdict was the result of 
reasoned application of the law, rather than 
prejudice engendered by the improper evidence. 
In the instant case the evidence was "undisputed": 
(R.5) 
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The evidence in this case really, for all intents 
and purposes, is undisputed that the assault occurred. 
Here the evidence is similarly "not contradictory". 
(Tr.131) 
Q (Defense counsel) Now, do you recall what 
happened when -now, did you hit her? 
A (Defendant) yes. 
Q How many times? 
A Once. I don't know. I might have hit her twice. 
I was mad and about three-quarters drunk. 
The judge said defendant's "credibility" was effected 
"somewhat" by his "prior record". (R. p.7): 
I think his CREDIBILITY for truth and veracity 
is SOMEWHAT impaired because of his PRIOR 
RECORD, (emphasis added) 
Also here the trier of fact exhibited a "reasoned 
application of the law" as the judge's extensive 
analysis of the law shows "rather than prejudice 
engendered by the improper evidence" (R. ps. 7-13) 
Because of the weight given by the judge to 
defendant's record, the undisputed uncontradicted 
evidence, and the judge's "reasoned application" of the 
law here like in Speer there is no "reasonable 
likelihood" or "reasonable probability" of a different 
result. 
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In State v, MorefrQUgQ, 748 P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 
1988), this Court was asked to review an ineffectiveness 
of counsel claim because counsel failed to test the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search and found: 
...no prejudice in failure to object to the 
evidence. This clearly falls within legitimate 
trial tactics of defense counsel, (citations 
omitted). 
In the instant case it is reasonable to assume 
defense counsel was aware of defendant's theft 
convictions and he chose not to object. As a trial 
tactic defense attorneys often do not object to 
evidence in order not to draw the trier of fact's 
attention to it. 
B-DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE 
In State v Frame. 723 P.2d at 402 (Utah 1986), the 
Court did described the standard to apply after 
defendant shows prejudice: 
...defendant has the burden to demonstrate 
that counsel's representations fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness, 
(citation omitted). Defendant must prove 
that specific, identified acts or omissions 
fall outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative 
reality,' sufficient to overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel rendered adequate 
assistance...(citations omitted) 
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No trial errors were made that overcome the "strong 
presumption" of "adequate assistance". Defendant can 
only speculate about the effectiveness of objecting to 
questions about his prior theft convictions. This was 
likely a tactical decision which is supported by law 
and shows deference to the fact this was a bench trial. 
Defendant argues his counsel allowed the prosecutor 
to "fish". (App. Br. at 2) Defendant was asked 
clarifying questions. A criminal record may be deceiving 
despite a prosecutor's good faith. This is especially 
confusing because third degree felonies are often 
reduced to Class A misdemeanors (a misdemeanor record 
is much less severe than a felony record) by methods 
such sentencing to a lower degree. 
Defendant attempts to impose a novel burden on the 
State by stating: (App. Br. at 11) 
...the prosecutor's question should have been 
objected to (these questions) unless it was 
known by counsel the prosecutor had some 
reliable documentation of any convictions. 
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Because there is no authority which requires a 
defense attorney to be aware of what evidence the 
prosecutor possesses this argument should be 
disregarded. As was stated in State v Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344, (Utah 1984): 
Since the defendant fails to support 
(her) argument by any legal analysis 
or authority we decline to rule on 
it. 
The prosecutor had reasonably accurate data about 
defendant's record as shown by his testimony. (Tr. 136) 
Defendant's assertion that defense counsel had no such 
"documentation" or knew the prosecutor did not possess 
them is not supported by the record. (App. Br. at 11) 
Defendant alleges he was improperly prepared by his 
attorney. (App. Br.at 5) a claim the Frame Court 
rejected because the appellant did not suggest what his 
testimony would have been. State v Frame, 723 P.2d at 
403 (Utah 1986) stated: 
These contentions (inadequate preparation) are 
also inadequately supported on 
appeal...(appellant) does not explain what his 
testimony would have been had he been 
adequately prepared. 
Here defendant makes no attempt to postulate alternative 
answers and this argument does not sustain his burden. 
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Defendant contends his attorney should have brought 
a motion in limine. (App Br.at 11) The general rule 
about these motions is stated in Middlebrook v Imler. 
TQnny, & Killer M.P, 713 P.2d 572. (Okla. 1985): 
The function of a Motion in Limine 
is to preclude introduction of 
prejudicial matters to a JURY, 
(emphasis added) 
Defense counsel's decision not to bring such a motion 
was no more than recognition of the purpose and futility 
of such action in a bench trial. Also, Utah Code Ann. 
sete. 77-35-12(b), which makes pre-trial motions 
discretionary states in part: 
Any defense, objection or request, 
including requests for rulings on the 
admissability of evidence, which is capable of 
determination without the trial of the general 
issue MAY be raised prior to trial by written 
motion, (emphasis added) 
Defendant attacks counsel's failure to object to 
the sufficiency of the prosecutor's foundation for the 
introduction of pictures. (App. Br. at 11) The 
prosecutor laid a perfect foundation for their 
introduction. (Tr.78, 79). 
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As the Court said in State v Purcell. 771 P.2d 243 
(Utah 1985): 
In general if a competent witness with 
personal knowledge of the facts represented by 
the photograph testifies the photograph 
accurately reflects those facts it is 
admissible (citation omitted) 
Defendant claims some pictures were cumulative and 
prejudicial. (App. Br. at 11) If the pictures had these 
characteristics it can be assumed the trial judge 
treated them in an appropriate manner Del Porto v 
Nicolo. 495 P.2d at 813 (Utah 1972). 
Defendant contends that objections were not made to 
"non-responsive" and prejudicial answers. The record 
does not have either a "non-responsive" or prejudicial 
answer. (Tr. 80) 
Defendant alleges counsel should have objected to 
"several" unidentified "damaging" questions on pages 
103-106, 112-114, 116-119, of the trial transcript but 
does not mention "specific, identified acts or 
omissions" and as such ought to be disregarded by this 
Court State v Frame. 723 P.2d at 403 (Utah 1986). (App. 
Br. at 12) 
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Defendant claims he was badgered although he fails 
identify these questions with Frame-specificity. (App 
Br. 12) He presents no authority indicating badgering is 
ineffective representation. This argument should be 
disregarded State v Amicone. 689 P.2d at 1344 (Utah 
1984). 
Defendant alleges that counsel failed to establish 
a provocation defense. (App. Br. at 12) This is 
contrary to the record (Tr. 38-36). 
Q (Defense counsel) And that his brother is 
retarded. Is that not true? 
A (Victim) Well, yes. 
Q But you do not remember making any comments 
about his retarded brother? 
A No. I don't recall it. No.. 
Q And you would consider that to be sort of a low 
blow? 
A It would be, yes, I would imagine. 
Q And you would recognize that would especially 
provoke him? 
A If it was said, yeah. But I don't remember 
saying anything about his brother. 
In defendant's footnote 2 he asserts his counsel 
permitted use of a hypothetical question which contained 
a fact not admitted in evidence: 
"... loss of memory ...does not carry the 
medical significance of a loss of 
consciousness." 
Medical ideas may have different titles. It is not 
supported in the record that these words for these 
purposes have distinct meanings. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
For all the above described reasons it is 
respectfully submitted that the defendant has not 
sustained his burden of showing ineffectiveness of 
counsel and the conviction be sustained. 
DATED this l$th_ day of April, 1988. 
Ovr-fey-A 
Charles Marson 
Attorney for Respondent 
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